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SPECIAL FEATURE
CONTEMPORARY SLAVERY

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY SLAVERY:
THE LONG VIEW
Rebecca J. Scott*
The idea of reasoning about contemporary labor conditions by analogy with an earlier regime of slavery is not new. Even before chattel slavery had been abolished in the French and British Caribbean in the first
half of the nineteenth century, activists had introduced the idea of conditions analogous to slavery. The British anti-slavery movement denounced
the trade in Chinese “coolie” laborers as morally comparable to the trade
in African captives, for the contracts under which the Chinese were engaged lacked the elements of true consent.1
Such analogies were particularly salient in societies where chattel slavery had once flourished. In the aftermath of the abolition of slavery in the
United States in 1865, for example, unrepentant former slaveholders and
opportunistic employers sought to reimpose many of the elements of slave
labor. Congress responded by interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution as providing the necessary warrant for federal statutes that assured former slaves of the right to choose their employer and prohibited state criminal prosecution of workers for leaving a
place of work.2 These measures were only unevenly effective in combatting labor abuse at the time,3 but they created a statutory framework that
was mobilized in subsequent campaigns against practices of coercion.4
*
Rebecca J. Scott is Charles Gibson Distinguished University Professor of History
and Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. She thanks Leonardo Barbosa,
Bénédicte Bourgeois, Sueann Caulfield, Christopher McCrudden, Carlos H. B. Haddad,
Priya Khangura, Davide Maldarella, Margo Schlanger, and Vladislava Stoyanova for ongoing
discussions of these issues.
1.
See Elliott Young, Chinese Coolies, Universal Rights and the Limits of Liberalism
in an Age of Empire, PAST AND PRESENT 121 (2015).
2.
A key first step was the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, 14 Stat. 50. This was followed by
the 1867 Peonage Act [March 2, 1867, Thirty-Ninth Congress. Sess. II. Ch. 187]. For an overview, see Risa Goluboff, Peonage, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (David S. Tanenhaus, ed., 2008).
3.
2 Land and Labor, 1866–1867, in 3 FREEDOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
EMANCIPATION, 1861–1867 21-60 (René Hayden et al. eds., 2013).
4.
On the re-activation of anti-peonage statutes during World War II, in response to
coercive conditions on sugar plantations in Florida, see Risa Goluboff, “Won’t You Please
Help Me Get My Son Home?”: Peonage, Patronage, and Protest in the World War II Urban
South, 24 L. AND SOC. INQUIRY 777 (1999).
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International law, too, was already implicated in the nineteenth century, as Great Britain initiated bilateral treaties against the transatlantic
slave trade with various slave-holding and slave-trading nations.5 These
treaties in turn yielded innovative binational courts for adjudicating cases
of the unlawful transport of African captives for sale into slavery. The resulting Mixed Courts were flawed mechanisms and generally dependent
on the seizures of ships by the British navy, but they helped to move the
international consensus toward formal disavowal of the transatlantic trade
in African captives.6
By the early decades of the twentieth century, with chattel slavery finally legally abolished in the last American redoubts of Cuba and Brazil,
international initiatives against practices of slavery shifted from bilateral
treaties to multilateral agreements. A commission constituted by the
League of Nations denounced the continued exercise of what it discerned
as slavery, with a focus outside of Europe and the Americas, but sought to
avoid scrutiny of practices in the colonies of the participating European
powers.7 Out of the commission’s recommendations emerged the Slavery
Convention of 1926, later supplemented in 1956, whose definition of slavery remains the most widely-recognized one in international law: “Slavery
is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”8 That language importantly points to the exercise over a person of the “powers attaching to” the
right of ownership, rather than limiting the prohibition to legally-recognized ownership as such. It has nonetheless at times been interpreted to
prohibit only what is taken to be “classic” slavery—that is, to cases of
formal ownership and/or direct control over physical movement.9
Once states had signed the 1926 Convention, they were formally
obliged to take steps to suppress such practices within their jurisdictions.
As with the earlier efforts against the transatlantic trade in African captives, however, many regimes resisted what they saw as encroachments on
5.
This subject has been addressed in detail for Cuba by DAVID MURRAY, ODIOUS
COMMERCE: BRITAIN, SPAIN AND THE ABOLITION OF THE CUBAN SLAVE TRADE (1980); on
Brazil, see BEATRIZ MAMIGONIAN, AFRICANOS LIVRES: A ABOLIÇÃO DO TRÁFICO DE ESCRAVOS NO BRASIL (2017); for a recent analytic overview see JENNY MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE
TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2012).
6.
On the frameworks for adjudication, see MARTINEZ, supra note 5, 67-98. On the
widespread undercutting and open violation of these treaties, and the violation of parallel
domestic legislation against the transatlantic trade in captives, see Randy J. Sparks, Blind
Justice: The United States’s Failure to Curb the Illegal Slave Trade, 35 L. AND HIST. REV., 53
(2017); and ERNEST OBADELE-STARKS, FREEBOOTERS AND SMUGGLERS: THE FOREIGN
SLAVE TRADE IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER 1808 (2007). For Cuba see MICHAEL ZEUSKE,
Amistad: A Hidden Network of Slavers and Merchants (2015); and for Brazil, MAMIGONIAN,
supra note 5.
7.
See SUZANNE MIERS, SLAVERY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE EVOLUTION OF
A GLOBAL PROBLEM (2003), especially chs. 8, 9, and 19.
8.
Slavery Convention art. 5, Sept. 25, 1926, 212 U.N.T.S. 17.
9.
Challenging such an interpretation both historically and analytically is one of the
central goals of many of the authors in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM
THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY (Jean Allain ed., 2012).
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sovereignty. Multiple exemptions, moreover, were granted to colonial
powers (including Britain).10 The 1956 Supplemental Convention attained
wide formal adherence but still lacked an enforcement mechanism and
was undercut by considerations of colonial policy.11
Against this historical background, the three essays in the present special issue explore the interactions between different regimes of international law and domestic regulation concerning practices that have come to
be named “contemporary slavery,” “conditions analogous to slavery,” or
simply “slavery.” Vladislava Stoyanova provides a comprehensive exploration of the complex framing of slavery within international law, examining
the key decisions in recent decades and the multiple problems of interpretation that they have raised. Bénédicte Bourgeois focuses on the (reluctant) reworking of enforcement in France in light of the European
Convention on Human Rights and recent decisions by the European
Court of Human Rights. Carlos H. B. Haddad traces the interplay of modern campaigns against domestic slave labor with Brazil’s longstanding
criminal prohibition of the imposition of a condition of labor “analogous
to that of a slave.”12
Together, these essays bring rigor and a broadened scope to debates
over the definition of modern slavery. In an overview that is a complement
to her recent book and to the prior work of Jean Allain, Stoyanova provides a close reading of the relevant conventions, protocols, and decisions,
setting a high standard for future analysis in cases that invoke the various
prohibitions on slavery in international law.13 She grapples in particular
with the uncertain conceptual triad of forced labor, servitude, and slavery.
It becomes clear how difficult it is to create bright-line distinctions between these three categories, which are sometimes construed as an ascending sequence of coercion: Is forced labor something temporary, while
servitude is imposed for an indefinite period, and slavery is a condition the
victim experiences as likely to last for life?
10.
MIERS, supra note 7, 128-130. For close study of Portugal’s African colonies in
these years, see Catarina Madeira Santos, Defining slavery and forced labor, creating a colonial fiction on labour in Angola: Portugal, the League of Nations and the International Labor
Office (1919-1946), in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ANGOLA: FROM SLAVING COLONY TO NATION
STATE (Maryann Buri & José C. Curto eds., forthcoming 2018).
11.
Miers, supra note 7, 331-332.
12.
See the essays that follow: Vladislava Stoyanova, United Nations against Slavery:
Unravelling Concepts, Institutions and Obligations 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359 (2017), Bénédicte
Bourgeois, Statutory Progress and Obstacles to Achieving an Effective Criminal Legislation
against the Modern-Day Forms of Slavery: The Case of France 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 455
(2017), and Carlos H. B. Haddad, The Definition of Slave Labor for Criminal Enforcement
and the Experience of Adjudication: The Case of Brazil 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 407 (2017). (The
descriptions of the situation in France and in Brazil that are not otherwise footnoted are
based on the essays of Bourgeois and Haddad).
13.
VLADISLAVA STOYANOVA, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY RECONSIDERED:
CONCEPTUAL LIMITS AND STATES’ POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN EUROPEAN LAW (2017); Jean
Allain, The Definition of Slavery in International Law, 52 HOW. L. J. 239 (2008-2009); and
ALLAIN, SLAVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OF HUMAN EXPLOITATION AND TRAFFICKING
(2012).
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Given that those who impose coerced labor may have varied sources
of power and divergent intentions, while the victims vary in the source of
their vulnerability and in their potential access to protection, no simple
temporal distinction seems to work. Unavoidable ambiguities, moreover,
have been compounded by the existence of overlapping international
monitoring bodies, depending on how the abuse is categorized—as a prohibited form of labor (hence largely under the purview of the International Labor Organization), a war crime (to be adjudicated by a special
tribunal or denounced by a United Nations body), or a violation of the
1926/1956 conventions against slavery (hence squarely in the realm of a
longstanding area of international law). Stoyanova concludes that despite
broad consensus on the existence of a human right not to be held in slavery, there is surprisingly little international case law clarifying states’ obligations to protect such a right.
The two essays that follow Stoyanova’s, by Bénédicte Bourgeois and
Carlos Haddad, move the analysis into specific national frames, providing
rich evidence and reasoning for future forays into what is sometimes called
“comparative international law,” the exploration of the relationship between specific dimensions of international law and the different domestic
enforcement regimes that emerge alongside or in dialogue with such law.14
Each of the two authors uncovers some unexpected perils attendant upon
the importation into domestic criminal law of language derived from documents initially crafted at the level of international declarations concerning
human rights. Haddad is particularly emphatic on the value of retaining
the existing and detailed Article 149 of the Brazilian Penal Code, as
amended in 2003, which offers as indicia of slave labor the imposition of
“degrading conditions” and “debilitating work days.” He cautions against
attempts to replace these with language drawn from the 1926/1956
documents.
For France, the relationship between international law and domestic
enforcement is shaped by France’s adherence to the European Convention
on Human Rights. In this context, the distinctions between forced labor,
servitude, and slavery might seem moot, given that all three are prohibited
by Article Four of the Convention.15 In practice, however, as Bénédicte
Bourgeois shows in her essay, the French legislature has had great difficulty in bringing to bear an effective regime of penalties for almost any
variant of what is publicly denominated esclavage moderne (modern
slavery).
Bourgeois, who has long worked as a practitioner in this area, shows
that in the pre-2013 French statutory regime, almost the only tools availa14.
For discussions of this method, as applied to human rights law, see Christopher
McCrudden, Why Do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties? A Comparative
International Law Analysis of CEDAW, 109 AM. J. OF INT’L L., 534 (2015).
15.

On the language and interpretation of Article 4, see Eur. Ct. H.R, GUIDE ON AR4 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: PROHIBITION OF SLAVERY AND
FORCED LABOUR (August 31, 2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_4_ENG
.pdf.
TICLE
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ble in the criminal code rested either on the broad concept of “human
dignity” or the narrow one of “inadequate remuneration.” The core affront to dignity that inheres in slavery and domestic servitude was discerned by some prosecutors and trial court judges, while other judges
relied on their own concepts of human dignity and were reluctant to find
such an abuse absent evidence of sexual violence, racist humiliation, or
appalling living conditions. It has also at times been easier for prosecutors
to achieve a conviction by shifting the focus to the immigration status of
the victim, rather than confronting the totality of the abuse.
There were nonetheless some notable prosecutions, thanks to aggressive work by victims’ advocates and attorneys. In the case that would
eventually be taken to the European Court of Human Rights as Siliadin v.
France, an initial conviction by the trial court had been reasoned away by
a court of appeals in Versailles, which made inferences about implied consent and invoked the normalcy of relentless domestic labor for women.
(The adolescent victim’s long hours of unremunerated work in childcare
and household labor were said to be unremarkable, because they were
akin to “the fate of many mothers.”)
The European Court of Human Rights chose in its decision in Siliadin
v. France to invoke the language of servitude, rather than the term “slavery,” but still deemed France to indeed be in violation of Article Four of
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court thus called upon
the French legislature to modify its criminal code to ensure penalties for
abusers and better protection for victims.16
Substantial modifications of that code were not forthcoming from the
legislature, however, and convictions remained difficult to obtain. Activists proceeded to lodge an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights
in the case of C. N. & V. v. France and were again largely successful.17
After this second firm rebuke from the European Court, French legislators
finally modified the penal code in 2013 to encompass the crimes of enslavement and imposition of forced labor or servitude.
In the process of making those modifications, French legislators imported wholesale the relevant language of the 1926/1956 Conventions,
transplanting sentences directly into the code. Bourgeois views this more
explicit recognition of the underlying crime as a victory, but is apprehensive about the challenges that lie ahead in using human rights language in
the context of criminal law, absent further precision on the component
practices that are to be penalized. A great deal will now depend on the
interpretations that emerge from an evolving domestic jurisprudence, in
which courts will have to grapple with the fact that the terms used in the
1926/1956 Conventions were not themselves designed to convey the specificity expected for domestic criminal prosecution.18
16.
17.
114032.
18.

Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.
C.N. & V. v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001The “Harvard-Bellagio Guidelines” that accompany the volume THE LEGAL UNSLAVERY, published by Oxford University Press in 2012, represented an
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On this point, the example of Brazil’s domestic campaign against slave
labor is particularly illuminating—and its recent fate alarming. Carlos
Haddad brings a distinctive perspective to the debate. As a federal judge
in the Amazonian district of Marabá, he heard dozens of criminal cases of
alleged trabalho escravo (slave labor), described under the Brazilian Penal
Code as the imposition of a condition “analogous to that of a slave” and
detailed through the inclusion of multiple specific circumstances that characterize the offense.19 As founding co-director of the first law school clinic
in Brazil on slave labor and human trafficking, Haddad and his colleagues
have explored the potential for civil advocacy within Brazil’s labor courts
on behalf of individual victims.20 He thus has a clear empirical understanding of the existing domestic enforcement regime—both its stark
weaknesses (criminal convictions for these offenses are almost never upheld upon final appeal) and its remarkable strengths (the inspection teams
and civil prosecutions for the imposition of “slave labor” have liberated
and compensated tens of thousands of victims, imposed settlements and
convictions in the labor courts on hundreds of perpetrators, and developed
a remarkable set of protocols for worksite inspections).21
In this light, Haddad expresses concern that under certain circumstances the international law “floor,” defined by the prohibition of the exercise of the “powers attaching to the right of ownership,” could become a
“ceiling” that inhibits the overall existing domestic campaign against the
imposition of slave labor. The national campaign has relied heavily on the
key concept of the imposition of “degrading conditions,” drawn directly
from the criminal code, and its parameters have emerged from dialogue
among inspectors, workers, civil society activists, and labor prosecutors.22
The 1926/1956 language from international law that so closely associates
slavery with ownership, by contrast, could—if adopted as a replacement—
be used by the enemies of enforcement to undermine the longstanding
domestic definitions. Haddad’s concern is not at all far-fetched: legislative
initiatives that are aimed at halting almost all enforcement have been introduced in the Brazilian Congress by the allies of large landowners, and
urban construction firms have sought to use the Supreme Federal Tribunal
interpretive step forward in the attempt to add specificity to the 1926/1956 language. They
nonetheless still rest on the property law concept of “control tantamount to possession,” a
phrase that does not itself answer the question of which forms of coercion shall be deemed to
represent an impermissible level of control. See Allain, ed., supra note 9, at 375.
19.
For a detailed discussion of the Brazilian legal framework, and of the enforcement
regime that has emerged from inspections carried out by innovative “mobile teams” of prosecutors and labor inspectors, see Rebecca J. Scott, Leonardo Barbosa, and Carlos H. B. Haddad, How Does the Law Put a Historical Analogy to Work?: Defining the imposition of “a
condition analogous to that of a slave” in modern Brazil, 13 DUKE J. OF CONST. L. AND PUB.
POL’Y (2017).
20.

On the clinic, see https://www.clinicatrabalhoescravo.com/.

21.
See Scott, Barbosa, & Haddad, How Does the Law Put a Historical Analogy to
Work?, supra note 19.
22.

Id.
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to block publication of the names of companies found in violation of domestic law in this area.23
Indeed, Haddad’s essay may have been prescient: as this volume goes
to press, Brazil’s executive branch has issued on October 16, 2017, a
portaria that redefines the term “slave labor,” thus superseding the definitions that have evolved over the last two decades of enforcement. The
executive order—after invoking multiple international treaties and declarations—lays out a new and much narrower set of definitions. The category of subjecting a worker to “degrading conditions” is demoted from its
prior status as a sufficient condition for meeting the definition of the imposition of slave labor. Instead, the new definition requires that inspectors
and prosecutors determine that there has been direct constraint on the
worker’s “freedom to come and go.”24 Such a requirement ignores the
abundant evidence that deceit, intentionally-imposed debt, fear, and isolation—replacing the chains and armed guards of an earlier era—have continued to enable employers to impose “degrading conditions” that do
indeed constitute an affront to personhood and human dignity.25 Although the recent executive order formally deals with unemployment benefits, labor inspections, and inclusion on a government list of violators, and
does not in itself alter the criminal code, this definitional shift—if sustained—is likely to have consequences in the labor courts and criminal
courts, as well. It is perhaps an index of the current degree of institutional
fracture in Brazil that within days prosecutors from the Public Ministry of
Labor and the Federal Public Ministry had filed a legal challenge to the
executive order.26 Civil society organizations point out that attempts to
narrow the definition of the offense, accompanied by the imposition of
sharp budget cuts, threaten to bring a near-halt to decades of inspection,
prosecution, and the provision of redress.27
The three essays in this special issue come together to confirm the
value of exploring varying domestic expressions of and adaptations to international legal ideals. In each polity, lawmakers have viewed the terms
“slavery” and “slave labor” in part through a domestic historical lens, and
have drafted (or failed to draft) legislation accordingly. The United States
23.

Id.

24.
Portaria MTB No. 1129, de 13 Outubro 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL [D.O] de 16.10.2017
(Brz.).
25.
For ethnographic and sociological data, see RICARDO REZENDE FIGUEIRA,
ADONIA ANTUNES PRADO & HORÁCIO ARUNTUNE DE SANT’ANA JÚNIOR, TRABALHO ESCRAVO CONTEMPORÁNEO: UM DEBATE TRANSDISCIPLINAR (2011); and RICARDO REZENDE
FIGUEIRA, ADONIA ANTUNES PRADO & EDNA MARIA GALVÃO, PRIVAÇÃO DE LIBERDADE
OU ATENTADO À DIGNIDADE: ESCRAVIDÃO CONTEMPORÂNEA (2013).
26.
Recomendação MPF No. 38/2017-AA, de 17 Outubro 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL
[D.O] de 17.10.2017 (Braz.).
27.
For critiques of the altered definition, particularly from civil society organizations,
see coverage by one of the major independent blogs, including Leonardo Sakamoto,
Governo atende a pedido de ruralistas e dificulta libertação de escravos, BLOG DO SAKAMOTO,
https://blogdosakamoto.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2017/10/16/governo-atende-a-pedido-de-ruralistas-e-dificulta-libertacao-de-escravos/.
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inherited core concepts dating back to the moment of abolition of chattel
slavery, and thus initially built its prohibitions of modern slavery on nineteenth-century rights guarantees and anti-peonage statutes, later reinforced by modern concepts of human trafficking.28 Having just emerged
from a long dictatorship, Brazilian lawmakers in 1988 crafted a constitution containing ringing human rights guarantees, and gradually amended
their mid-twentieth-century penal code and labor legislation to address
contemporary working conditions. France, where consciousness about historical slavery has been relatively slow to develop, only very recently incorporated into domestic law explicit language referring to modern
slavery, drawing nearly word-for-word from the 1926/1956 international
conventions.
The appearance of variants of the word “slavery” in both international
law and modern domestic statutes has also on occasion given rise to
heated debate over whether modern conditions are in fact “analogous” in
a meaningful way to the historical institution of chattel slavery.29 Some
scholars balk at the rhetorical overreach of non-profit groups whose publicity implies that modern slavery is in some sense “even worse than” historical slavery, thus seeming to diminish the significance of a massive
historical wrong for which redress has never been granted.30 The rich analysis in these three articles suggests that the analogy with historical slavery
can nonetheless be sustained if it is employed to acknowledge the deep
dignitary offenses that lay at the heart of chattel slavery and those that lie
at the heart of contemporary coerced and degrading labor. Coerced labor
today is generally extracted in quite different ways from the laws and
whips of the nineteenth century. Some of the core features of such contemporary labor are nonetheless experienced as affronts to personhood, as
well as risks to life and limb.31
The shared goal that emerges in each of these analyses is to respect
the uniqueness and bitter legacy of the historical institution that is being
invoked by analogy, while securing a framework for preventing or suppressing the reemergence of a particular set of devastating offenses against
human dignity. Not all abuse of those whose vulnerability arises from
structures of poverty, conditions of conflict, or regimes of immigration
constitutes “slavery.” But it seems clear that an identifiable subset of labor
conditions imposed through the intentional magnification of that vulnera28.
The relationship between the concept of “slavery” and the more recent concept of
“human trafficking” is shifting and complex, both in international law and in domestic enforcement. For an exploration of the legislative framework for enforcement in the United
States, see BRIDGETTE CARR, ANNE MILGRAM, KATHLEEN KIM & STEPHEN WARNATH,
EDS., HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAW AND POLICY (2014).
29.
For empirical evidence and continuing debate on the analogical use of the concepts
of slavery and slave trade, see the articles in the Forum “A Crime Against Humanity”: Slavery
and the Boundaries of Legality, Past and Present, 35 L. AND HIST. REV. (2017).
30.
See Ariela J. Gross & Chantal Thomas, The New Abolitionism, International Law,
and the Memory of Slavery, 35 L. AND HIST. REV. 99 (2017).
31.

See Scott, Barbosa & Haddad, supra note 19.
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bility can indeed be discerned within frameworks that use—cautiously and
judiciously—an analogy with a prior regime openly designated as
“slavery.”

